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I
INTRODUCTION: ABORTION AS A VICE CRIME
Until 1973, the year of the Supreme Court's landmark abortion decision,
Roe v. Wade, I a list of "vice" crimes might have included drug offenses,
gambling, pornography, prostitution, consensual homosexual behavior, and
abortion. Part of the justification for grouping abortion with these other
offenses was its link with illicit sexuality, which clearly was seen as a vice.
However, the most important reason was simply the functional one that the
problems encountered in the enforcement of the abortion laws were in many
practical ways quite similar to those met with in the suppression of the other
vice crimes. Indeed, the use of the term "vice" to designate these crimes
might be in part an artifact of police organization, since the vice squad often
had jurisdiction over more than one of these offenses.
Additionally, the other names by which these crimes were known posed at
least as many difficulties. For instance, calling them "victimless" crimes is an
invitation to acrimonious dispute. To be sure, a vice crime must be an activity
which is willingly engaged in by its participants. Rapes have never been
regarded as vice crimes. In the case of some vice crimes, particularly the drug
and gambling offenses, one might argue that a participant, the consumer, is
victimized because of his or her own weakness; in others, such as prostitution,
one might regard both participants, the seller as well as the buyer, as victims.
Moreover, if pornography leads to rape, as is argued by some in the academic
community, 2 then its victims are neither the seller nor the buyer, but rather
the innocent women who are attacked. In addition, others charge that society
in general, including friends and family of the participants, are also harmed
by, and thus are victims of, the forbidden conduct. 3
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Of all the vice crimes, the labelling of abortion as a victimless offense
provokes the angriest outcry. A large and vocal group regards calling
abortion a victimless crime as a positive affront, on the ground that it not only
decides what they consider to be the very question at issue, whether or not a
fetus is a person, but also, in their view does so wrongly.
For most vice crimes, the use of the term "consensual" provokes much less
acrimony than does "victimless." This term does not appear to pass
judgment on the issue of whether there is a victim to the activity. It also
succeeds in focusing on a practical aspect of all the vice crimes: Those
involved have consented, do not see themselves as injured, and do not
complain to the police. The consequences of this silence for the criminal
investigation and enforcement of the laws against these behaviors have been
detailed elsewhere-most notably by Herbert Packer in his landmark book,
The Limits of the Criminal Sanction.4 These crimes are characterized by a low
number of arrests compared to the amount of criminal activity, problems of
selective prosecution, police reliance on a whole series of intrusive and
expensive means of investigation, such as the use of informants and decoys,
and a high level of payoffs to the police and other forms of corruption. 5
When used in reference to illegal abortion, however, the term consensual
is not a great deal better than victimless. It merely underscores that the fetus,
which the foes of abortion regard as a human being, has not consented to
anything. Under this view one might argue that homicide, leaving no victim
who can complain to the police, is equally consensual. Of course, the
difference is a practical one. The difficulty of disposing of a human body so
that no traces are left for forensic examiners is well known; and human beings
usually have family members and acquaintances who often ask after them and
go to the police if the answers are not satisfactory. These factors make
homicide far more similar to the crimes with victims who complain than to the
victimless, consensual, or vice crimes.
There are two additional reasons to classify abortion as a vice crime.
Abortion was perceived by a sizable (and, until 1973, a dominant) segment of
the population as wicked. Polls indicated that a few years before Roe v. Wade,
the great majority of the public perceived abortion, even in the first trimester
of pregnancy, as inappropriate, except in a narrow range of circumstances
such as where the mother's life was endangered or the pregnancy arose from a
rape.6 In fact, the legislatures of the great majority of states had spoken
clearly against the practice. 7
Similarly, the element of moral dissension, present in all the vice crimes,
was especially clear with respect to abortion. Those who performed and
underwent abortions prior to Roe v. Wade rejected the prevailing moral view.
Indeed, the disagreement was perhaps more widespread as to abortion than
4. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 151-52 (1968).
5. Id. at 329-30.
6. See Opinion Roundup: Abortion, PUBLIC OPINION, April/May 1985, at 27.
7. Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 118 (1973).
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as to any other vice crime with the possible exception of gambling. In 1965,
only about 15 percent 8 of the population were in favor of making abortion
legal "under all circumstances." On the eve of Roe v. Wade, a considerably
higher portion of the public agreed. 9
There are, however, two problems with characterizing abortion as a vice
crime. First, one of the connotations of vice is that it is pleasurable to the
person engaged in the activity. Gambling may not meet this requirement, if
practitioners are motivated more by hope of financial gain than by pleasure.
Similarly, many heroin addicts report that they seek a fix, not to feel good, but
to feel "normal" and to avoid feeling bad.' 0 Nonetheless, at least in the
public mind, and for the most part in actuality, the idea of pleasure-seeking
does seem involved in the crimes ordinarily grouped under the heading of
vice. " This is not the case with respect to abortion.
The second connotation of vice which cuts against including abortion
under that heading is that vice generally connotes a repetitive activity or habit.
While all of the other vice crimes are repeated quite frequently by those who
commit them, getting an abortion is quite a different kind of behavior.
Apparently, most women receiving abortions before Roe v. Wade were doing
so for the first time,' 2 as is still the case today.' 3
In fact, the concepts of victimless, consensual, and vice crimes are
somewhat fuzzy around the edges. After all, bribery certainly fits the
description of a crime where neither participant considers himself a victim,
and hence, is not reported to the police. Although bribery is similar to the
vice crimes in the means by which its prohibition must be enforced, it is not
considered a vice because no moral dissension exists on the issue. Had Mark
Moore come along earlier with the term "invisible" crime, it would have been
a better, more functional, and less divisive nomenclature for all these
crimes. 14 For the moment, the important fact is that the similarities among all
of these crimes, abortion before Roe v. Wade included, greatly outweigh the
differences.
Whether abortion, where it is illegal, is classified as either a vice,
consensual, victimless, or invisible crime turns out to be extremely important
for predicting a society's response to the practice.
8. See Opinion Roundup, supra note 6, at 27.
9. Id.
10. SeeJ. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 27-31 (1983).
11. For a general discussion of pleasure and vice crimes, see J. KAPLAN &J. SKOLNICK, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 28-37 (4th ed. 1987).
12. See N. LEE, THE SEARCH FOR AN ABORTIONIST 37 (1969).
13. C. TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW 119 (6th ed. 1986).
14. See Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement, in ABSCAM
ETHICS 21-23 (G. Caplan ed. 1983).
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II
THE FUTURE OF ROE V. WADE
The chances are, that at the time of the first election of Ronald Reagan as
President, most careful observers of the Supreme Court would have granted a
relatively short life expectancy to Roe v. Wade. 15 The appointment of believers
in "strict construction" or "judicial restraint" was high on President Reagan's
list of priorities.' 6 Strict constructionists oppose giving constitutional
protection to rights, such as the right to privacy,' 7 that are not specified in the
Constitution. They also oppose any entry by the Supreme Court into areas of
political controversy, especially if this entry is on the liberal side.' 8 On both
of these grounds, the Supreme Court's abortion decision stands out as the
preeminent target.
At the time of Ronald Reagan's inaugural, the average age of the justices
who espoused the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade was nearly 73 years. 19 It
was expected, then, that if the president were elected to two terms, he would
be able to fill several vacancies on the court. Moreover, although technically
Roe v. Wade was a seven to two decision, 20 most observers regarded the vote of
one of the majority, the Chief Justice, as, at the very least, shaky. 2 1 His
concurrence with the result emphasized his agreement with the majority on
the understanding that it did not permit abortion on demand.2 2 However,
insofar as the first trimester of pregnancy is concerned, the majority opinion
clearly does permit abortion on demand.23 It was alleged, even at the time of
the decision, that the Chief Justice voted as he did solely so that he could
exercise his prerogative, as a member of the majority, to assign the writing of
the opinion. Then, as soon as the Court was within one vote of overruling the
decision, he would switch to make a new majority.2 4 In fact, he never got this
opportunity. However, some evidence in support of this viewpoint is that
15. See The Reagan Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1980, at A26, col. 1; see also Turner, Reagan Says He
Would Not Use Single Issue Test to Pick Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
16. See The Great Debate: Interpreting our Written Constitution, Address by President Ronald
Reagan at the Investiture of ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia,
reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 53-56 (1986).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113-15 (1973). The vote was as follows: Majority: Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, and Powell; Concurred: Justices Burger, Douglas, and Stewart;
Dissented: Justices Rehnquist and White. On January 20, 1981, their ages were as follows:
Blackmun, 72; Marshall, 72; Brennan, 74; and Powell, 73.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., The Week the Supreme Court Changed Colour?, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1987, at 25.
22. 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, CJ., concurring) ("I.do not read the Court's holdings today as
having the sweeping consequences attributed to them by the dissenting Justices; the dissenting views
discount the reality that the vast majority of physicians observe the standards of their profession, and
act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health. Plainly,
the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on demand.").
23. 410 U.S. at 164 ("For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician.").
24. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 169-74 (1979).
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shortly before his retirement, and indeed at his last opportunity to do so, the
Chief Justice did announce his recantation.2 5
The majority in Roe v. Wade has lasted surprisingly long. Only two
vacancies appeared in the first six years of the Reagan presidency, 26 and one
of these, Chief Justice Burger's, was always considered a vote to overrule the
case at the opportune time. With the resignation ofJustice Powell, there seem
to be four solid votes in favor of the retention of Roe v. Wade (Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens). Whether the first two Reagan
appointees (Justices O'Connor and Scalia) and his latest appointee (Justice
Kennedy) 27 are prepared to overrule Roe v. Wade is uncertain, but there is
certainly no reason for confidence that they will not.28
Of course, few things in the world of law, any more than in politics, or
indeed in almost any other field of human endeavor, are certain. Miranda v.
Arizona 29 was also a target of the Reagan presidential campaign, and the two
Nixon campaigns earlier.3° In fact, no president has had a good word to say
about that decision since its promulgation by a 5-4 majority in 1965.
Notwithstanding a significant pruning and restriction, however, Miranda has
yet to be overruled.
Two factors, however, indicate a shorter life expectancy for Roe v. Wade.
First, a sizable part of the conservative constituency which would be expected
to argue for the overruling of Miranda has already come to terms with the
decision and fears that if the decision is overruled it might be replaced by
something worse, at least from the police viewpoint. Those opposing
abortion show no signs of coming to terms with Roe v. Wade.
Second, technological development may have undermined a considerable
portion of the scientific reasoning behind Roe v. Wade. The age at which
fetuses are viable has declined with medical advances, and the safety of
childbirth has been greatly improved. 3' To the extent that the Supreme
Court decision was based on these factors, and there is at least some language
in the Court's opinion to suggest this,32 it has been made partially obsolete by
25. Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2190
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I regretfully conclude that some of the concerns of the dissenting
justices in Roe .... have now been realized.").
26. Justice Stewart was replaced by justice O'Connor in 1981; ChiefJustice Burger was replaced
by Associate Justice Rehnquist, whose position was in turn taken by Justice Scalia in 1986.
27. Justice Powell was replaced by Justice Kennedy in 1988.
28. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Nonetheless, it is apparent from the Court's opinion that neither sound constitutional
theory nor our need to decide cases based on the application of neutral principles can accommodate
an analytical framework that varies according to the (stages) of pregnancy, where those stages, and
their concomitant standards of review, differ according to the level of medical technology available
when a particular challenge to state regulation occurs.").
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
30. See L. BAKER, MIRA NDA: CRIME, LAw & POLITICs 245-46 (1983); see also Shenon, Meese Article
Attacks Rule on Warning Suspects, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1987, at N9, col. 1.
31. See Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639-41 (1986).
32. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ("With respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.").
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these advances. The importance of the technological developments is not
that they require that the decision be overruled. Rather, it lies in their effect
on ajustice who would not have been in favor of the decision initially but who
believes that stare decisis is a barrier to overruling it. The technological changes
provide an intellectually respectable argument in support of such a Justice's
predilections.
If Roe v. Wade is not overruled, what follows will be merely a long thought-
experiment. It will be worthwhile for whatever light it sheds upon the nature
of our vice laws, and for any effect it may have upon the dialogue over a
constitutional amendment to overturn the abortion decision. On the other
hand, if Roe v. Wade is overruled, what follows may be a look into the future.
III
THE POLITICAL BATTLE
Overruling Roe v. Wade would by no means end the political battle over
abortion. That case simply rendered unconstitutional state statutes
forbidding abortion. If Roe v. Wade were overruled, the law would not
automatically return to the status quo ante and recriminalize abortion. Before
these changes could occur, in nearly every state, the legislature would have to
pass, and then the governor sign, a new statute. In some states, the old anti-
abortion statutes have been repealed, simply as a housekeeping matter, to get
rid of what were seen as unconstitutional restrictions. 33 In other states, the
statutes criminalizing abortion have been repealed as part of a new statutory
scheme which the draftsmen thought would have a better chance of passing
Supreme Court muster.34 Moreover, if the putative overruling of Roe v. Wade
were to be incomplete, and a new decision required certain exceptions or
formalities to be put in place before an anti-abortion law could be held
constitutional, the passage of new abortion laws might be necessitated in all
states, as was the case some years ago with respect to capital punishment.
It is not unrealistic to think that for some considerable time after any
overruling of Roe v. Wade, abortion would be illegal in some states while
remaining legal in others because of an inability to pass the requisite
criminalizing statutes. Capital punishment, for example, is supported by an
estimated 68 percent to 80 percent of Americans,35 and hence is considerably
more popular than anti-abortion laws. However, the death penalty is still not
in place in thirteen states and the District of Columbia,3 6 even eleven years
after the Supreme Court's decision validating capital punishment.3 7
33. See, e.g., Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1987, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950-25958
(amended 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1987).
34. See, e.g., Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 81-21 to 81-35 (amended 1979
and 1984). This replaced the old Illinois Abortion Law that existed pre-Roe v. Wade (ILL. ANN. STAT.
§§ 23-1 to 23-3 (1981)).
35. See Opinion Roundup: The Death Penalty Considered, PUBLIC OPINION, June/July 1985, at 38-39.
36. J. KAPLAN &J. SKOLNICK, supra note 11, at 619.
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 45-47 (1986).
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Failure to reinstate the death penalty is not primarily due to the
concentration of its opponents in particular jurisdictions. 'It appears that a
solid majority of citizenry of every state supports the death penalty for
murder. In some states a fairly broad consensus among the political elite has
been able to block the enactment of the death penalty-especially in states
such as Michigan which lack a tradition of capital punishment.38 In others,
popular governors or entrenched legislative leaders have, as a matter of
conscience, prevented the enactment of such laws, without any noticeable loss
of public popularity. 39
Probably the most important problem in enacting anti-abortion laws is
that, nationally, the public is almost evenly split on the issue. 40
It must be remembered that Roe v. Wade at least did not come out of the
blue. In the decade before Roe v. Wade, at least eighteen states had liberalized
abortion laws, most of them in the five years before 1973.41 Of these states,
four,4 2 by statute, permitted essentially free abortions, and several others,
including California, applied a somewhat restrictive statute to provide what
amounted to abortion on demand. Although a backlash set in shortly after
Roe v. Wade, it must not be forgotten that, at the time, the case seemed to
many to be the culmination of a national (indeed international) movement to
relax abortion laws.
Today, after the popular backlash has reached what appears to be a steady
state, the even balance on whether to permit abortion on demand is striking.
Thus, in one poll the public split almost evenly on whether abortion should be
allowed because the "family has low income and cannot afford any more
children;" the woman "is not married and does not want to marry the man;"
or the woman "is married and does not want any more children." 43 Similarly,
the Gallup poll, in 1986, asked its population sample this question: "The U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that a woman may go to a doctor to end pregnancy
at any time during the first three months of pregnancy. Do you favor or
oppose this ruling?" 44 Nationwide, 45 percent said "yes," 45 percent said
"no," and 10 percent had no opinion. 45
Support for the Supreme Court's decision varies significantly by region.
In the East and West, a favorable view of the Court's decision leads by 50
percent to 39 percent and 52 percent to 39 percent respectively. 46 In the
Midwest, both views tie at 46 percent, 47 and in the South, the ruling is
opposed by 52 percent and supported by 36 percent.48
38. See R. SCHWED, ABOLITION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 14 (1983).
39. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 37, at 36-45.
40. See Opinion Roundup, supra note 6, at 27.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973).
42. Id.
43. See Opinion Roundup, supra note 6, at 27.
44. See G. GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL, Feb. 20, 1986, at 49.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 50.
48. Id.
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It is likely that a complicating factor in the effort to pass anti-abortion laws
in the different states would be the great variation in the public acceptance of
various reasons for abortion. Nationally, the public is overwhelmingly (about
80 percent) in favor of recognizing a woman's right to have an abortion where
the child was conceived "as a result of rape;" where there is a "strong chance
of serious defect in the baby;" and where the "woman's health is seriously
endangered."49
Anti-abortion forces are likely to split between those who are willing to
compromise as to these exceptions and those who will remain steadfast in
their opposition to abortion for any reason. The "right-to-life" partisans are
more likely to see the issue as a moral one; thus, compromise to achieve
acceptable legislation will be difficult. Anyone who regards abortion as
murder will not tolerate lightly even those abortions which 80 percent of
Americans do find acceptable. Indeed, one of the exceptions to an anti-
abortion law which would have support from all but the ardent anti-abortion
activists is where the baby is likely to be born seriously deformed or otherwise
defective. However, the anti-abortion activists seem to be virtually
unanimously and vehemently opposed to this. 50
Even the activists are split on some issues. Catholic doctrine does not
permit abortion even where childbirth might result in the death of both
mother and child. 5' One historian states that Francis B. Kenrick, the Bishop
of Philadelphia, took the position in 1841 that, "two deaths were better than
one murder."'52 Indeed, this very dispute was a factor that contributed to the
failure of a constitutional amendment to overturn Roe v. Wade. 53
There are other obstacles to compromise that would make the legislative
struggle especially contentious. Support for an exception where the
psychological health of the woman is in danger falls somewhere between the
reasons for abortion which the great majority of the population will accept
and those upon which the public is equally divided. The concern stems,
however, from the likelihood that women desiring an abortion could routinely
get a psychiatric opinion in their favor, and that such a standard might
become the equivalent of abortion on demand. Indeed, the British Abortion
Act of 1967, 54 which is usually considered to provide abortion on demand,
merely provides that the abortion may be performed if it is certified by "two
registered medical practitioners" that "the continuance of the pregnancy
would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to fhe
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of
49. See Opinion Roundup, supra note 6, at 27.
50. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 149 (1984).
51. See Suro, The Papal Visit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1987, at Al, col. 1; The Vatican on Birth Science,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A15, col. 2; Berger, Catholic Dissent on Church Rules Found, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1987, at A7, col. 1; see alsoJ. MCCARTNEY, UNBORN PERSONS (1987).
52. K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 31; see also F. KENRICK, THEOLOGIAE MORALIJ 110-13 (1861).
53. See Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Abortion, Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 2d Sess. 310-12 (1976); see also Hearings on a Human Life Bill, Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th
Cong. 1st Sess. (S. 158 H.R. 900) (1981).
54. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, in PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS AND MEASURES OF 1967, part II at 2033.
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her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated." 55 At the very
least, one can say that the political donnybrook which consideration of anti-
abortion laws will bring on makes any prediction of the state-by-state
outcomes even more uncertain.
Finally, consideration of the interplay between the legislature and the
popular vote in an initiative or referendum further complicates the matter.
The anti-abortion activists, for various reasons including their high level of
commitment, have considerably more political power in state legislatures than
their numbers alone would indicate. It is likely, however, that in popular
votes where individual political figures need not fear retaliation, the anti-
abortion forces will do far less well. In fact, even in Massachusetts, which one
might have predicted would be a staunchly anti-abortion state, a referendum
to prevent public financing of abortions was soundly defeated. 56
IV
THE LEGAL PATCHWORK
While it is difficult to speculate on the pattern of states which would ban
abortion, unless solid and large areas of the nation do this, it is hard to think
of a better recipe for an unenforceable policy. The policy would be
unenforceable not because the criminal laws against vice crimes are so difficult
to enforce. Rather, as long as going to an area where abortion is legal is
easier than violating the law, abortions performed will not even be illegal.
Assuming the demand for abortion is relatively inelastic, since those who want
abortions want them very much, it is unlikely that the restriction would be of
major significance. The marginal reduction in abortions will come from
among the very poor 57 who are unable to afford transportation to states where
the practice is permitted. For instance, it would not make much practical
sense for New Jersey to attempt to forbid abortion to its residents so long as
New York permits it.
The dilemma of states that permit abortion but lie near others that forbid
the practice is a difficult one. States can subvert their neighbors' abortion
policies in a way that they cannot with respect to capital punishment. Indeed,
a state's restrictive abortion policy is even more easily undermined than its
policy in the area of guns, cigarettes, or liquor. At least in these latter cases,
the bringing of contraband into a state from another state that does not have
the same prohibition or high tax rate can be inhibited by searches at the
border and arrests for possession of contraband in the receiving state.
A state which forbids abortion might attempt to criminalize a resident's
temporary departure from the state to receive an abortion. However, such a
55. Id. at 2034.
56. The referendum was rejected. Yes: 673,311; No: 935,419, See A Summary of Questions on the
Ballot in Mass., Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1986, at 23, col. 1. See also Greenhouse, A Turning Point on the
Abortion Issue?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at BI0, col. 3.
57. For a discussion of the effect of the cost of abortion on the poor, see Cates, The Hyde
Amendment in Action, 246J.A.M.A. 1109 (1981).
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prosecution not only is fraught with difficulties of proof, invasions of privacy,
and perhaps even constitutional problems, but it also has the great
disadvantage of bearing down upon the consumer of the illegal service rather
than, as is usually the case, the provider.
Interestingly, even before Roe v. Wade, the woman who obtained an
abortion was typically not made a criminal. 58 Society viewed her more as a
victim, forced by her own need into the toils of the abortionist. Perhaps more
importantly, charging the woman with a crime might make her less likely to
cooperate in a prosecution of her abortionist. If she were found guilty of any
crime, in many states she would be treated as an accomplice, and as such her
testimony against the abortionist would then have to be corroborated. 59
Probably the most important reason for not making the woman a criminal was
that there were simply far too many women who obtained abortions for the
state to prosecute all of them.
A state cannot effectively prevent its citizens from receiving abortions in
other states by inhibiting information as to where out-of-state abortions may
be performed. 60 Any such attempt would raise difficult first amendment
issues and would probably be unenforceable as well. Even if a state could
prevent advertisements from reaching its citizens and deter personal
communications within the state directed toward getting an out-of-state
abortion, this would not be nearly enough. All that the New Jersey resident in
search of an abortion needs to know is that the procedure is available in New
York. If further information is available there, that is probably sufficient to
subvert New Jersey's policy almost completely.
The problem might run deeper than one state's simply adhering to its own
public policy, indifferent to that of its neighbor. Often, states deliberately
subvert the policy of their neighbors for the purpose of advancing their own
interests. Thus, Nevada's divorce law for some time brought a great deal of
business into the state, while subverting the policy of other states, and its
legalization of gambling and perhaps even prostitution has had the same
effect. Many states have lotteries which are designed to subvert the anti-
gambling policies of their neighbors. It is likely, too, that New Hampshire's
tax on liquor would be higher if that state could not count on the large
purchases by Massachusetts residents seeking illegally to avoid the high liquor
taxes of their home state.
V
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Presumably, if the political battles fought within states result in a national
patchwork, where some states prohibit and others allow abortion, the major
58. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 40A-5-3 (1953) (making the abortionist criminally liable).
59. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.22 (McKinney 1981).
60. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Advertisements for abortion services in another
state, where abortion is legal, are not stripped of first amendment protection in states where such
services are prohibited.).
[Vol. 51 : No. I
ABORTION AS A VICE CRIME
anti-abortion effort would have to move to the national level. Anti-abortion
groups would inevitably bring pressure upon the Congress to throw its entire
weight against abortion. There are various ways this might be done. One is
by making the performance of an abortion, subject to certain narrow
exceptions, a federal crime. Another is by passing a law which threatens to
withhold from any state which permits abortions, the very large amounts of
federal funds6 1 for medical care for other social services which are absolutely
necessary to the states' meeting what they see as their obligations.
Though this latter course would most likely coerce recalcitrant states into
banning abortion, neither of these options is particularly attractive. Making
abortion a federal crime might raise serious constitutional issues, and while
withholding federal funds would be much less vulnerable to this type of
attack, it would likely result in a situation where the states which are forced to
make abortion illegal might be extremely lackadaisical in enforcing their laws.
Moreover, the equal popular balance on the issue and the strength of the
federalism concerns involved would probably prevent either solution from
being politically acceptable.
The thrust of attempted anti-abortion legislation might be somewhat
different. The most common way the federal government has intervened to
prevent one state from frustrating the policy of another has been through the
direct use of the interstate commerce power, instead of attempting to change
the law within any state. Thus, Congress could make it a crime to travel in
interstate commerce to obtain an abortion. Though there are numerous
analogies to this in our federal criminal jurisprudence, 62 such a solution does
not seem well adapted to the abortion problem. Indeed, it would face many
of the same problems encountered by a state statute seeking to control the
travel of that state's residents.
It is likely that a statute making it a federal crime to perform an abortion
on a resident of another state would be seen as better adapted to the problem.
The closest analogy to this would be the laws presently in place that prevent
gun dealers in one state from selling guns to residents of other states if the
guns are illegal there. 63 Given the differences in viewpoint on abortion
among Americans, a forceful argument might be made that the federal
government, rather than taking sides on the question, would be leaving that
decision to the individual states and only intervening to prevent one state
from subverting another's public policy.
Unless and until this or something like it is done, any anti-abortion laws
passed in the wake of an overruling of Roe v. Wade could so easily be evaded
61. Consider, for example, a 1970's law restricting federal highway improvement funds from
states not enforcing 55 mph speed limit. See Koza, Drivers Ignore 55 mph Limits; May Cost State Highway
Aid, Los Angeles Daily J., Dec. 3, 1980, at 1, § II, col. 1.
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (1948) (making the transportation of dentures into states with
local monopolies illegal). See also White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (Supp. 1986)) (transportation of persons across state
boundaries for the purpose of prostitution).
63. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (1968).
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that the number of abortions performed in the United States would probably
not be significantly diminished. Of course, whether the political climate at the
time these issues come up would permit the weight of the federal government
to be brought to bear against abortion in any way is yet another question.
VI
ABORTION BEFORE ROE V. WADE
Before Roe v. Wade, abortion seemed in some ways to be the easiest of the
vice crimes for the police to inhibit. This was not because the consumers were
indifferent to the activity. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that
those who wanted an abortion wanted one very much and with considerable
urgency. For those who were unmarried, the disadvantages of pregnancy
were great in terms of loss of status in their families, schools, or immediate
neighborhoods. For all, the inability to obtain an abortion meant the physical
discomfort of pregnancy and childbirth, and the subsequent burden of an
unwanted child. Though this latter problem could presumably have been
alleviated by putting the baby up for adoption, this often involved a degree of
shame; many regarded this behavior as irresponsible.
Nonetheless, despite what one might regard as the highly inelastic demand
for an abortion, there were several factors militating against abortions prior to
Roe v. Wade. First of all, the woman who did not want to bear a child had
typically found out that she was pregnant through a medical test performed by
a physician. This raised many difficulties. Her very request for a pregnancy
test was an acknowledgment of her sexual activity at a time when society by no
means took this for granted. Reluctance to take such a test often caused a
delay, which reduced the relatively short time she had for the abortion to be
performed safely.
The test was also expensive. The cost of about thirty dollars, including the
fee for the doctor's visit, was presumably not enough to prevent the women
from being tested, considering the high stakes involved. However, it was
often expensive enough to delay the test until the likelihood of pregnancy was
somewhat greater than it would have been just after the biologically necessary
lapse of time for the test to be accurate. This, of course, also delayed the
abortion.
Moreover, even in those cases where there was no expense, as where the
testing was done free at a family planning clinic, there were problems. Since
there simply were not many such clinics, the ones that did exist were often
hard to reach, especially for women outside urban centers. Regardless of the
clinic's location, it took some courage for the woman to be seen going into
one.
Finally, if the woman "failed" the test, a member of "society" would know
she was pregnant. From the viewpoint of enforcement, this tended to make
abortion a little more like murder than the other vice crimes. In a murder
case, even if the body has disappeared, the fact that someone knows of a
victim may result in apprehension and would be, at the very least, a constant
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threat to the perpetrator. The social stigma attached to abortion was great,
and many women who desired abortions did not know that it was not criminal
for them to obtain one. In such a situation, the potential dissemination of the
fact that one was pregnant must have been a significant deterrent to obtaining
an abortion.
One study of 114 women who had procured illegal abortions in 1965
revealed that forty-four, had gone to their regular doctors to ask for a
pregnancy test. 64 Fourteen of the forty-four refused to go back to these
doctors, either because the doctors had refused to help them in their search
for an abortion or because they feared the doctors would turn them in to the
police. 65 Seventeen of those who did not go to their regular doctors went to a
doctor recommended by someone else, while an equal number selected a
doctor at random from the telephone book or because of convenient
location. 66 Twenty-three other women sought to avoid detection or
embarrassment by having the test done through other channels. 67 Of these,
nine took a urine sample to a laboratory or drugstore, while two more were
fortunate enough to know someone who could do the test directly. 68 Twelve
others, often using false names and addresses, "used the relative anonymity of
a local hospital or clinic to have a test made, to avoid meeting a doctor who
might take a personal interest in the fact of the pregnancy." 69 Nine of the
women in the study never went for a test. 70
Once the woman knew she was pregnant, she often found it difficult to
locate someone to perform the abortion. A major distinction between those
who search for heroin and those who search for an abortion, both of whom
have a relatively inelastic demand curve, is that the heroin addict typically is
already familiar with how to obtain the drug and is part of a drug culture
which spreads information among its members as to the drug's availability
and how to avoid apprehension while procuring it.71 Before Roe v. Wade, the
woman who sought an abortion, however, was often very much alone. She
was not a repeat player herself and, hence, faced problems of information
gathering in finding an abortionist. While virtually all addicts know other
addicts, the person needing an abortion before Roe v. Wade typically knew of
no one else who had obtained one. And where she did know another person
who had contacted an abortionist, the nature of the market was such that the
same contact might not work again. Furthermore, abandonment by the male
partner often produced its own shock and immobility in the pregnant woman.
The sudden requirement that the perhaps previously passive female take
64. N. LEE, supra note 12, at 47.
65. Id. at 107.
66. Id. at 47.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 46.
71. SeeJ. KAPLAN, supra note 10.
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charge of the consequences of the pregnancy sometimes necessitated a major
shift in orientation-and contributed to further delay and greater risk.
Perhaps the most important reason for whatever success the criminal law
had in preventing abortion was a consequence of abortion being a medical
procedure. Physicians as a group would seem to be extremely deterrable; if
they are threatened with criminal punishment for performing a procedure,
one would expect that they would comply with the law. After all, they have
more legitimate income and higher status than the purveyors of virtually any
other illegal goods or services, and hence have more to lose by conviction.
Consequently, they have less to gain, compared to what they have to lose,
from performing this relatively inexpensive operation. Being upper middle
class and more forward-looking, physicians would seem to be more likely to
calculate the costs and benefits of their actions and hence be more easily
deterred by the criminal law from all but the most profitable forms of crime.
Finally, physicians have been socialized into keeping records of all their
operations, a behavior that would seem to make their activities easier to
uncover.
The unwillingness of physicians to perform abortions did not mean that
illegal abortions would not be performed. What it meant was that often
abortions would be performed by less deterrable, nonmedical personnel or by
medical personnel who charged a good deal to compensate them for the risk
they were taking. In fact, an illegal abortion before Roe v. Wade cost $400 to
$500,72 while today, thirteen years after the decision, the now legal procedure
can be procured for as little as $80. 73
Interestingly, the only two available studies of the question indicate that in
the period before Roe v. Wade about 80 percent of illegal abortions were
performed by physicians. 74 Of course, these studies are hardly definitive. It is
likely that the percentage varied greatly from area to area and from time to
time, with the percentage performed by physicians increasing as public
attitudes toward abortion changed.
Although the physicians performing abortions were probably more
competent at it than were those without medical training, having the abortion
performed by a physician did not necessarily mean that the job was
competently done. The physician performing the abortion was more likely to
be one of lower professional stature, inexperienced, and in a hurry as well. As
a result, although an abortion, if legal, could be done with minimal medical
risk, its illegal status made the procedure more physically dangerous because
of a lack of skill of its practitioners and for various other reasons-even
holding constant the later point in the pregnancy at which the illegal abortion
tended to be performed.
72. See N. LEE, supra note 12, at 95.
73. See Village Voice, June 30, 1987, at 109 (classified advertisement).
74. Schur, Abortion, ANNALS 136-47 (1968) (citing A. KINSEY & M. CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1958)); P. GEBHARD, PREGNANCY, BIRTH, AND ABORTION 198-99 (1958).
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It is likely that all of these difficulties reinforced each other. The obstacles
to being tested for pregnancy tended to postpone the search for an abortion;
the difficulty of the search tended to postpone the finding of an abortionist;
the later the abortion was performed, the more dangerous and difficult the
procedure. In addition, the deterrence of medical personnel not only made
the search for an abortionist more difficult and time-consuming, but often led
to a situation where the abortionist was more likely to be unskilled. Both of
these factors increased the danger of the operation, which in turn might have
made the woman delay even further.
Nonetheless, the remarkable thing about the restrictions imposed by the
pre-Roe v. Wade abortion laws is that some of the literature indicates they
prevented only half of the abortions that would have taken place without
them. 75 This is the conclusion reached, as to one state, Hawaii, by Franklin
Zimring, who compared the number of abortions the year after abortions
became legal with the fall in the birth rate that year. He discovered that the
number of legal abortions, all of which had been recorded, was twice the drop
in the number of births. 76 This fact, together with an examination of
abortions and births among particular groups, led him to conclude that the
number of abortions had less than doubled with the legalization of the
procedure and, hence, that more than half that number of abortions had been
taking place illegally before abortion had been legalized. 77
Other estimates place the effect of the preliberalization of criminal laws in
restraining abortion in the same general range. According to the sociologist,
Edwin Schur, "it has been reported that police consider criminal abortion the
third biggest illegal endeavor in the United States, surpassed only by
gambling and narcotics .... -78 Perhaps the best assessment of the
prevalence of illegal abortion prior to Roe v. Wade is that of Whittemore, who,
computing the number of abortions in the mid-1960's by a number of
different means, concluded that "the oft-quoted figure of one million criminal
abortions in the United States is a fairly reasonable estimate."' 79 This is three-
quarters the number of abortions reported in our most recent government
statistics.8 0
There is no doubt, however, that the number of illegal abortions taking
place before Roe v. Wade was surprisingly high. Part of the reason for this was
the extreme difficulty of catching abortionists, even as compared to the
perpetrators of the other vice crimes. First of all, the number of forbidden
transactions needed to fulfill the entire demand for abortion in the United
75. See Zimring, Of Doctors, Deterrence, and the Dark Figure of Crime-A Note on Abortion in Hawaii, 39
CHI. L. REV. 699, 717 (1972).
76. Id. at 706.
77. Id. at 709.
78. E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITIOUT VICTIMS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY: ABORTION,
HOMOSEXUALITY, DRUG ADDICTION 25 (1965).
79. Whittemore, The Availability of Non-Hospital Abortions, in ABORTION IN A CHANGING WORLD 217
(P. Hall ed. 1970).
80. See generally Center for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Preliminary Analysis-United States,
1982-1983, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 7SS (1986).
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States was markedly lower. Even the one and a half million abortions a year
presently performed is less by a factor of at least one hundred than the
number of purchases and uses of heroin by our 500,000 heroin addicts. The
disparity is even greater with respect to marijuana, gambling, and, though it is
hard to be sure, probably of prostitution, as well. This relative scarcity of
criminal events makes it more difficult for the police to find those which do
occur.
In the case of abortion, the illegal transactions were expensive, compared
to the retail sales forbidden by most of the other vice laws. Thus, it paid the
participants to take the kinds of precautions against discovery that would be
uneconomical for less profitable sales; for a retail drug sale, it would not pay
to have the purchaser wait on a certain street corner to be picked up and taken
to a place which he did not know in advance to engage in the forbidden
transaction. Yet, this was a common means of protecting the anonymity of the
illegal abortionist.
Abortion was unusual among the vice crimes in that it did not involve
contraband, the possession of which constituted a crime. Instruments
necessary to induce abortions were probably present in most physicians'
offices, plus those of many nonphysician medical workers. In addition, these
instruments were freely available as items of commerce, durably capable of
being used repeatedly, and easily adapted from other available materials.
This not only made it more difficult to convict abortionists who were not
caught in the act, it also promoted ease of entry into the illegal business.
Presumably, there would be a great many more illegal retail dealers in all
kinds of contraband, from drugs to illegal guns, if the supply could be easily
obtained without risk.
In addition, the abortion industry, unlike that supporting drugs or
gambling services, had a relatively nonhierarchical and undifferentiated
structure. There were no producers, importers, wholesalers, and kilogram
dealers above the retail level as there are in the illegal drug business. Nor
were there the bankers, layoff bookies, telegraph services, enforcers, and the
host of other specialized operators apart from the retail level, that comprise
the illegal gambling industry.
This "industry structure" had a number of consequences for the
enforcement of the abortion laws. First, it meant that the "yield" to law
enforcement of infiltrating an organization was low; there were no "big cases"
to be made. Moreover, the lack of a differentiated organization or a supply
line of significant length greatly reduced the ability of law enforcement to
disrupt the operation. In drug cases, where the police can seize money or
expensive contraband, and in gambling cases, where they can seize money or
betting slips, the interference with the ongoing business and the loss of
working capital might injure the operation more than would criminal
prosecution.
In these respects, illegal abortion was like another vice crime where the
supply line was a very short one-prostitution. But prostitution, or at least
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street walking prostitution, is more risky because, in order to attract business,
the street walkers must advertise their presence and, hence, become
vulnerable to loitering arrests, decoy operations, or police harassment. In a
way, abortion was more like the call-girl business, which is notoriously difficult
for the police to suppress-despite the availability of vice squad officers to act
as decoys. With respect to abortion, however, the decoys had to be women-
who were (and still are ) grossly underrepresented in police work.
Finally, in both prostitution cases and narcotics cases at the retail level,
virtually everybody involved is also guilty of some other criminal activity, has a
police record, or is dependent upon police goodwill in one way or another.
Not only may they be coerced by the police into giving information and
cooperating in investigations, but they are in no position to complain about
the wholesale violations of their rights that routinely Occur on the street.
The women who had obtained or were seeking abortions and those
persons who performed abortions were likely to be in a different situation.
The police not only had to be more careful in dealing with them, but were
more likely to find it unrewarding. The women getting abortions tended to be
loyal to those who had helped them; it was therefore difficult to find those
who could be pressured into informing or acting as a decoy to allow the police
to work their way up to "Mr. or Ms. Big." Finally, the class bias of police
enforcement in this area worked against enforcement of the abortion laws.
The seekers and performers of abortions and their allies were far more likely
to be middle class and able to respond vigorously to the kinds of police abuse
that was (and is) common in the enforcement of the other vice crimes.
In view of these difficulties, it is not surprising that the prosecution rate for
abortion was low. But it was more than merely low, it was amazingly low.
According to one authority:
In Alabama in the period 1894 to 1932, for example, there were forty indictments and
five convictions; in Arkansas between 1921 and 1932, twenty-seven indictments and
nine convictions; in Massachusetts between 1849 and 1858, thirty-two indictments and
one conviction; in Michigan between 1893 and 1932, 156 indictments and forty
convictions; in Minnesota between 1911 and 1930, 100 indictments and thirty-one
convictions; and in Utah between 1896 and 1932 seventeen indictments and three
convictions. By the same token, convicted abortionists were often dealt with leniently.
A statistical analysis of all 111 convictions for abortion in New York County between
1925 and 1950 (about four convictions per year) indicates that 44 percent of those
convicted were given probation. This is all the more remarkable when it is realized
that 55 percent of these prosecutions were brought about because of a woman who
was sufficiently ill after the abortion to arouse public notice and that in 10 percent of
the cases the woman had died as a result of the abortion. 8 1
81. K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 53-54. For a modem example of this phenomenon in Canada,
see Court in Canada Rules on Abortion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at Y3, col. 1.
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VII
ILLEGAL ABORTION IN TODAY'S WORLD
A. Technological Changes
The world has changed considerably since Roe v. Wade, and it is unlikely
new abortion laws comparable to those prevailing before 1973 would reduce
the number of abortions to a level between the one-half and one-third as
would be predicted from Zimring's study.82 First of all, technology has
advanced considerably in the interim. The important technological advances
have come in two areas: pregnancy testing and the performance of abortion
itself.
So far as pregnancy testing is concerned, the expense, embarrassment, and
delay a woman faces in finding out whether she is pregnant can be largely
eliminated. There are already on the market several reliable home pregnancy
testing kits. They cost about $10 each,8 3 and are at least as sensitive as those
used by physicians in 1973. Moreover, the development of home pregnancy
tests is continuing. The tests have only been available for about ten years and
are still being refined and made more sensitive, simpler to use, and perhaps
even cheaper. One of these tests, the enzyme immunoassay test, can provide
information that the user is pregnant on the same day as a missed menses. 84
Nor is it likely that states will be able to interfere with the distribution of such
tests; they are too useful for those who wish to bear children and who wish to
begin prenatal care at the earliest time.
The second major area of technological advance has been in the
performance of abortion itself. There is evidence that even illegal abortions
were becoming much safer in the years before Roe v. Wade, as medical
technology advanced. 85 The much greater advances made while abortion has
been legal make it very unlikely that the safety and ease of the operation
would be reduced to a level close to that before Roe v. Wade.
The degree of technical advance in the performance of abortion has been
somewhat surprising, considering that abortion, when legal, had long been a
relatively simple and safe procedure. Probably the major reason why
technical development in the area has been so rapid is the increase, after Roe
v. Wade, in the number of abortions performed by licensed medical personnel.
Observation and the kind of controlled experiments that could not take place
when abortion was illegal, then, taught physicians a good deal about what they
could and could not do efficaciously and safely.
Before Roe v. Wade the dominant means of abortion in the first trimester
(which presently accounts for 91 percent of the abortions) was surgical
82. See Zimring, supra note 75.
83. For example, VLI Co. Clearblue Test, OPC Co. Advance test.
84. See Brucker, What's New in Pregnancy Tests, 14 J. OF OBSTETRIC & NEONATAL NURSING 358
(1985).
85. See Illegal Abortion: Deaths in the United States, 14 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, May/June
1982, at 164. See C. TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, supra note 13, at 131.
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abortion.8 6 This procedure, also called "D and C" (dilation and curettage),
amounted to scraping out the fetus along with the lining of the uterus. First
the woman's cervix was dilated by forcing into its opening a number of rods of
gradually increasing diameter, one at a time, until an opening was made wide
enough for the insertion of the curette, a kind of sharp metal scraper.8
7
Some of the dangers of this procedure are obvious. The forcible dilation
of the uterine cervix or the scraping, or curettage, were likely to injure and
even puncture the uterus wall if it was performed by an unskilled operator or
even by a skillful one who was in a hurry. And, of course, when abortions
were illegal, the abortionist often was in a hurry; for every extra minute spent
on the operation increased the risk of being apprehended in the act. In
addition, the abortionist typically performed the operation without complete
anesthesia for two reasons. First, the doctor often did not have the proper
facilities (including an assistant) to administer anesthesia, and, second, not
using anesthesia reduces the possibility of an emergency requiring the
patient's hospitalization, such as an allergic reaction. 88 Not only did this make
the procedure a painful one, but the inevitable twitches and jerks which the
unanesthetized curettage caused made it more likely that injury would occur
during the process. Incomplete currettment subjected the woman to the
immediate dread of uncontrollable hemorrhage. Indeed, some "abortions"
were done on nonpregnant women with menstrual disturbances. Injury of the
small, firm uterus expected to be larger was frequent and resulted from failure
to obtain the expected amount of material. Redoubled effort to complete the
procedure often led to perforation injury.
Finally, this method of abortion was not even always available. Before
abortion was practiced widely, the conventional wisdom was that the uterus
became too large for D and C after the twelfth week of pregnancy. After the
twelfth week of pregnancy, it was believed that abortions should be delayed
until the sixteenth week, when saline abortion, a much more complicated
procedure, could be used.89
Today suction, or vacuum abortion, an entirely different procedure, is
used in the great majority of first trimester abortions and even in abortions
somewhat after this time. 90 It is faster, less painful, and far less subject to
complications than the older procedures. In a suction abortion, a thin, plastic
tube, called a cannula, is inserted into the uterus. The cannula is attached to a
small pump (or to a syringe) creating a vacuum which sucks out the lining of
the uterus along with the fetus and membranes attached to it.9 1 Until the
eighth week of pregnancy, the cervix may not even have to be dilated, since
the cannula, at most 6 millimeters wide, and far smaller than the curette, is
narrow enough to fit through the opening of the cervix softened by
86. See N. LEE, supra note 12, at 93.
87. See W. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 117-19 (1984).
88. See N. LEE, supra note 12, at 85.
89. W. HERN, supra note 87, at 123.
90. J. HODGSON, ABORTION AND STERILIZATION: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 236 (1981).
91. W. HERN, supra note 87, at 111-16.
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pregnancy. Moreover, the plastic tube, being comparatively soft, is somewhat
less likely to puncture the uterus. In fact, vacuum aspiration abortion may be
used up to the fourteenth week of pregnancy, though this is slightly more
complicated, since the cannula then is up to twelve millimeters in diameter
and the cervix must therefore be dilated. By the fourteenth week, well over 90
percent of today's legal abortions will already have been performed. 92
Technology has continued to advance in this area. A new drug known as
RU-486 is currently being tested both in Europe and in Southern California.9 3
It is a steroid which blocks the action of progesterone, the body's hormone
which prevents the uterus from expelling the fetus. In the absence of this
hormone the fetus is expelled. The current understanding is that the drug
has minimal side effects and is 80 percent effective when administered within
the first six weeks of pregnancy. 94 Research is continuing to provide new,
safer, and easier means of producing an abortion. A combination of RU-486
and another drug has raised the percentage of successful abortions to 90
percent. RU-486, according to medical experts, is about one to five years
from the commercial market. 95
The importance of this drug and its successors is that it permits self-
abortion at a time and place convenient to the woman. In fact, self-abortion
with instruments even occurs occasionally today (presumably when the
woman is completely without funds or fears discovery so much she is
unwilling to appear even for a legal abortion) and is extremely dangerous.
Performing the procedure through the use of drugs like RU-486 has
transformed the enforcement of laws against abortion into an attempt to
suppress a drug traffic. Since drugs, whether psychoactive or abortofacient,
are easy to conceal and to sell on an illegal market, obtaining an illegal
abortion will become as easy as purchasing an illegal drug.
B. Social Changes
Probably even more important than the technological advances since the
time of Roe v. Wade have been the social changes in the United States. These
changes fall into two related, but independently important categories-
institutional changes and changes in public consciousness.
Among the institutional changes since Roe v. Wade are the changes in the
laws of other nations which have made abortion legal and easily available. For
many women, these changes will make the availability of abortion simply a
function of economics. Toward the end of the period before Roe v. Wade,
women were already travelling in increasing numbers to foreign countries to
get their abortions. 96 At first, this was relatively uncommon, since most
92. See Abortion Surveillance: Preliminar, Analysis-United States, 1982-1983, supra note 80, at 8SS
(1986).
93. See Kaye, Are You Ready for RU-486, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1987, at 12.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. See also Drug Induced Abortions Now Possible, San Francisco Chron.,June 8, 1988, at B4, col.
1.
96. For a discussion of the case of one such woman see K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 62-65.
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countries had laws similar to those of the United States. (England first
legalized most abortions in 1967.) Now, many countries have abortion laws as
permissive as those in the United States today, and, in fact, serve many
foreigners. (England, for instance, performs 20,000 abortions a year on
women from Spain.) 97
It is probably most important to note that, in Canada, abortion is legal. 98
While legal or not, abortion is also easily obtainable in Mexico as well. 99 And
it is very likely that if a sufficient market develops, a number of Caribbean
countries, which have in the past helped Americans evade their nation's
laws, 100 will do the same as to abortion. Moreover, the price of travel has
declined sharply since 1973, thus making it even more likely that if abortion
becomes less legally available in the United States, a much higher percentage
of our population will be able simply to leave the country temporarily for their
operations.
Those travelling abroad would include not only the very rich but also a
considerable number of the middle class, and lower middle class. The poor,
upon whom the anti-abortion law would fall most heavily, would of course
have the fewest opportunities to get around the law by travelling to another
country; but even for many of them, especially those who live close to our
borders, the amount of money required would be minimal.' 0 '
Institutions within the United States have changed as well in the past
fifteen years. At the time of Roe v. Wade, family planning agencies such as
Planned Parenthood were scattered throughout the nation, but there were
large numbers of women not served by any agency. According to one study,
there were, in 1968, 800 such agencies serving about 800,000 women. 10 2
Now there are 4,200 agencies serving over 4.2 million women.' 0 3 Since these
agencies do a great deal more now than merely provide abortions, they will
likely remain in business even where abortion is illegal. And it is likely that, to
the limits that the laws against aiding and abetting would allow, many of them
would give emotional support to women seeking abortions. That is not to say
that they would violate federal or state law. It is unlikely that any law would
inhibit their providing home pregnancy tests on a large scale, counselling
women on whether they can legally obtain an abortion in the United States, or
97. See C. TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, supra note 13, at 52 (legal abortions carried out under the 1967
abortion act in England and Wales).
98. For a discussion of legal and illegal abortion in Canada, see CAN. CRIM. CODE 251(l)(4)
(Tremeear's 1987). See also Morgentaler v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 616 (1976); LAw REFORM
COMMISSION OF CANADA, ABORTION REFORM: THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS (1988).
99. See N. LEE, supra note 12, at 5.
100. For a discussion of the use of the Caribbean for the evasion of U.S. law, see R. BLUM,
OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES (1984).
101. The cost of a round trip bus fare from Los Angeles to Tijuana is under thirty-five dollars.
From San Diego to Tijuana is approximately eight dollars.
102. See Organized Family Planning Services in the United States, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Nov/Dec. 1979,
at 342.
103. Id.
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perhaps even advising those who can afford the trip to leave the country for
an abortion.
Moreover, unless the federal government criminalizes abortion
throughout the nation, there would still be operational abortion clinics in
those states which permit them. These would inevitably provide a network
even for those women from out-of-state who are legally disabled by federal
law from receiving abortions. Such women may nonetheless be able to seek
out employees of the clinics who regularly perform legal abortions and may in
some cases be able to convince them to break the law. It may well be much
easier to induce trained personnel from these clinics to perform abortions on
out-of-state residents than to find people to enter an entirely illegal business
in a state that enforces its abortion law vigorously. This may be especially
likely if, as is probable, the federal resources devoted to monitoring abortion
on out-of-staters in states where abortion is generally legal may be stretched
very thin. In addition, the legal abortion clinics are likely to provide a
constant reservoir of trained abortionists who can work even in states that
forbid abortion, though for the first few years that any such anti-abortion laws
are in place, the reservoir of already trained employees will be quite large
anyway.
Another change in the institutions of the United States since Roe v. Wade,
or more precisely since about five years before that case, has been the
development of large numbers of women's groups whose members believe
quite passionately that women have a right (whether it is a constitutional or
merely a moral right is not important) to an abortion should they desire
one. 10 4 It is very likely that these women would act not only as a support for
those seeking abortion,.but also as a conduit of information. One can argue
that by helping women to obtain abortions, they would be aiding and abetting
criminal acts and, hence, would render themselves criminally liable. It is not
clear, however, how real the threat of prosecution would be and how many
women will be so ideologically committed that they would be undeterred by
the law.
The other change in the United States since the time of Roe v. Wade is
perhaps even more fundamental than the institutional change. There has
been a basic shift in popular consciousness on abortion. In 1965, only about
15 percent of the population believed in a right to abortion on demand. 10 5
Today, about half of the population supports such a right; 10 6 and many of
these people are passionate in their belief. This support for rights to abortion
on demand will make the reenactment of anti-abortion laws in many states
impossible and make major federal intervention in the area difficult.
One of the effects of the changes mentioned above will be the number of
people willing to perform abortions. Today, one-half of the obstetric and
gynocological residents in the United States are women. It is likely that
104. See K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 93-100.
105. See Opinion Roundup, supra note 6.
106. Id.
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physicians who perform illegal abortions in the future will not only be less
marginal and more competent but more moved by ideology and compassion,
and less by desire for profit. In addition, now that the stigma attached to
performing abortions has been greatly reduced, regardless of the law, it may
be predicted that many more physicians will be willing to cooperate in them.
Certainly the formal nongovernmental sanctions against this conduct (such as
expulsion from medical societies) will be rendered less likely.
VIII
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-ABORTION LAWS
Another effect of the change in consciousness as to abortion will be on
those obtaining abortions. They will fear less the social stigma of being
revealed, and presumably will be less willing to cooperate with investigation
and prosecution of these cases. If, as also seems likely, the percentage of
poorly performed abortions drops sharply too, there will be fewer women
with even this reason to cooperate with the police, and thus fewer cases to
come to police notice through routine medical channels.
Perhaps the most important effect, however, will be on the behavior of the
legal system. Of course, it is unlikely that those performing abortions will be
very much moved by the fact that prosecutors will find it very hard to come by
juries to convict them.'0 7 For all but zealots, the unpleasantness of arrest and
the cost and stigma of standing trial are such that they are sufficient deterrents
themselves. Nonetheless, the diminished likelihood of criminal conviction
will almost certainly lower the deterrent effect of the law upon those
undertaking to perform abortions.
Jury acquittals will have an even more dramatic effect on prosecutors and
the police than on those threatened with prosecution. The difficulty of
showing concrete results in terms of convictions will tend to make prosecutors
more reluctant to prosecute abortionists and to dampen the willingness of the
police to invest in investigations. This is not surprising. Experience with the
enforcement of other vice crimes has shown that where the police must use
informants and decoys to make their cases, they often lose enthusiasm for
enforcement. 08
Several factors, apart from the changes in public consciousness, make it
more likely that law enforcement will lose heart in attempting to suppress
abortion. The lower number of abortion complications would lower the
number of cases coming to their attention through reports from hospitals and
occasionally from coroners. The use of decoys, the other major way police
apprehend abortionists, would be made much more difficult by the ease and
speed of pregnancy testing. Any abortionist willing to invest the time and
107. An example from Canada illustrates this problem. Henry Mergentlaby, an operator of an
abortion clinic, was tried four times and even though there was no doubt as to his actions, was
acquitted by four different juries.
108. See H. PACKER, supra note 4.
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effort in taking precautions can require that his prospective client be tested
for pregnancy in his presence before any further discussions take place. This
would impose on the police the requirement not only that they use women as
decoys, but also that they use women who are in fact in their first trimester of
pregnancy. Finally, the fact that typically there is no significant amount of
forfeitable property which the police can seize in abortion cases has become
more important since the days of Roe v. Wade. Increasingly, funds received
from forfeiture are being used to provide resources for law enforcement, and
an incentive for police departments to devote more energy to the drug
problem and less energy to the less "profitable" vice crimes such as abortion.
Ix
THE ULTIMATE EFFECT OF OVERRULING ROE V. WADE
The result of overruling Roe v. Wade would be to reintroduce abortion as a
vice crime-and one especially hard to suppress, at that. Does this mean that
all of the energy and passion spent in politicking by both the pro-choice and
the pro-life sides will be wasted? The answer, on reflection, is perhaps more
complicated than it might first appear. One might regard the abortion issue
as a kind of zero sum game in which two groups, both of whom care
passionately about the issue, are engaged. However, in fact, there are several
dimensions along which the struggle can be measured.
First, regarding the number of abortions performed, it is the thrust of this
article that because of the advance of technology and the nature of U.S.
political institutions, no great change in the number of abortions would occur
as the direct result of overruling Roe v. Wade and the statutory aftermath.
That is not to say that in the long run, even the relatively ineffective
enforcement of a criminal law will be without a somewhat more significant
effect. Often a demand which seems quite inelastic in the short run turns out
to be much more elastic over time. It is likely that even slight increases in the
difficulty of abortion will be met by some increase in the use of contraception,
some decrease in sexual activity, and some increase in childbearing. After all,
it took some years for the nation to adjust to the system of available abortion
allowed by Roe v. Wade. In 1974, the first full year after Roe v. Wade, 763,500
abortions were reported. 10 9 This number climbed steadily over the next
seven years to a total of 1,300,800'10 abortions in 1981. Since then the
number has been relatively stable, rising to the current level of about
1,500,000 per year.Ill It is likely that changes in overall fertility, absorption
of women into the job market, in welfare policies, and in contraceptive
methods will have more effect than does the legal treatment of abortion." 2
109. See C. TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, supra note 13, at 40-4 1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The case of Romania probably indicates the short and long term effects of laws against
abortion, though because of the high degree of police control in that country the effect is
considerably exaggerated. In November 1966, without warning, the government, moved by
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The number of abortions, however, is not the only dimension by which
groups may measure their success in this battle. Those on both sides of the
issue care passionately and are engaged in a symbolic as well as a practical
struggle. According to Kristin Luker in her superb and sensitive study of the
issue, the basic dispute is over the proper role of women in our society." l3
The "right-to-lifers" regard motherhood and the raising of a family as the
most important function a woman can perform. Their entire ideology,
including their views as to the proper purposes of sex and the nature of the
fetus as a person entitled to human rights, follows from this premise.," 4 It is
likely that not all right-to-lifers proceed from this ideological basis. Others
have different reasons for considering the fetus a human life, rather than
merely a "prospective life" and, hence, for regarding abortion as murder. All,
however, hold their position as a moral one and often refer with some
contempt to those in favor of abortion as "utilitarians." 5
On the other hand, those who are pro-choice espouse abortion on demand
as a woman's right and regard motherhood as but one part of a woman's
role. 16 They regard abortion as a necessary means of controlling a woman's
fertility so that she can perform adequately in the labor market as well as in
her own family, should she choose to have one.
For anti-abortion advocates, overruling Roe v. Wade would be as much a
symbolic victory as a victory in fact. It was the shock of that decision which
galvanized many of them into action to begin with,"! 7 even though many lived
in states such as California and New York which had already liberalized their
abortion laws. It is not clear whether Roe v. Wade increased anti-abortion
advocates' commitment and militancy (1) by affronting them with the
assertion that their political action, even if they undertook it, would be
unavailing to criminalize abortion; (2) by giving free abortion, to which they
were unalterably opposed, the especially high status of being written into the
Constitution; or (3) by making the abortion issue so salient and publicly
visible that they could no longer ignore it.
Which particular fact of Roe v. Wade triggered pro-life activism may be
quite important in predicting the reaction to a situation where abortion, in the
dissatisfaction with the nation's low birth rate, abruptly changed its abortion policy. Abortion, which
had been freely available for a fee of $2.00, was banned. In addition, the government restricted
access to contraception and increased allowances, tax benefits, housing benefits, and maternity leaves
for parents, particularly those with two or more children. In one year, fertility rose from 14.3 births
per thousand population in 1966, to 27.4 births per thousand population in 1967. Gradually,
however, the fertility rates dropped and the number of abortions rose again so that by 1983 the birth
rate had returned to precisely the 1966 level. In March of 1984, the government announced new and
more vigorous efforts against abortion. See Berelson, Romania's 1966 Anti-Abortion Decree: The
Demographic Experience of the First Decade, 33 POPULATION STUDIES 209, 209-22 (1979); Tietelbaum,
Fertility Effects of the Abolition of Legal Abortion in Romania, 26 POPULATION STUDIES 401, 401-17 (1972);
Romanian Population Policy, 10 POPULATION & DEVELOPMENT REV. 570, 570-73 (1984).
113. See K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 193-94.
114. Id. at 204-08.
115. Id. See also Lake, The Metaethical Framework of Anti-Abortion Rhetoric, 11 SIGNS 478, 478-99
(1986).
116. See K. LUKER, supra note 50, at 175-79.
117. Id. at 137-40.
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great majority of cases, would be against the law but where most women who
wished could nonetheless obtain one. It is likely that this Situation would be
deeply unsatisfying to them, but whether they would regard the symbolic
victory as enough is hard to predict. One could, of course, say "some
would-some wouldn't," but this is hardly helpful without some sense of the
numbers and the commitment involved.
Nonetheless, several affronts to the anti-abortion forces would be removed
by widespread criminal laws against abortion. First, the number of abortions
reported by health and census authorities would no longer shock them.
Under today's conditions, all of the 1,500,000 legal abortions are counted,
classified, and published; the number itself is shocking to many people.
Traditional vice crimes are not tallied nearly as well and must be estimated, a
process far more easily disputed or ignored.
Next, the passage of anti-abortion laws, even if it caused no reduction in
the number of abortions, would remove the feeling of complicity which has
clearly bothered many of the "pro-lifers." One anti-abortion writer argued
that political action was essential "to rid us of the guilt we involve ourselves in
as a nation by permitting mass nationwide abortion to continue." '" 8 Another
author, even before Roe v. Wade, warned that a sense of complicity in legalized
abortion could force those who oppose abortion to be "wholly alienated from
the body politic"" 9 and predicated that legalizing abortion might cause
revolution by anyone who refuses "to go on supporting a government which
he thinks kills the innocent .... 120 This feeling is also evident in the
rejection of the pro-choice stand that abortion is a personal matter and that
no one is forced to have an abortion. "It is like telling someone in Nazi
Germany, 'don't worry, your hands are clean. You don't have to guard the
camps.' "121
Finally, anti-abortion activists desire the criminalization of abortion not
only for its effect in directly lowering the number of abortions, but also for its
educational, moral, and symbolic effects. The Reverend Edward Bryce, a
member of the Catholic Bishops' Committee for Prolife Activities, asserts,
"Given the important educative role that law has in a pluralistic society, [our
abortion] policy is a powerful force in promoting the acceptance of
abortion." 22 Furthermore,
[t]hese days our pluralism itself, combined with the pressures of a homogenized
national culture, results in the boundaries of morality being largely marked out by the
boundaries of the law. To believe that this society can effectively insist on the value of
fetal life while refusing to restrict legislatively any assault that a woman may choose on
that value is to indulge in sociological fantasy.
12 3
118. See H. BROWN, DEATH BEFORE BIRTH 156 (1970).
119. See Stith, A Secular Case Against Abortion, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 12, 1971, at 153.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. See E. BRYCE, AMERICA 166 (1982).
123. Id.
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In other words, in the view of many right-to-lifers, abortion must be
criminalized in order to correctly express the value society gives to human
life.
The pro-choice advocates, on the other hand, would clearly be less happy
with the situation than they are today. For them, overruling Roe v. Wade
would be a symbolic defeat, not balanced by any compensating improvement,
since but for the defeats on funding they have suffered, they have every reason
to be satisfied with the status quo. For them, any comparison with the
situation at the time of Roe v. Wade, or with 1965, before the state-by-state
move to liberalize abortion laws began, is irrelevant. From the situation at the
present time, overruling Roe v. Wade and any legislative response to this would
represent a loss of ground both practically, and to a much greater extent,
symbolically.
This symbolic defeat, moreover, will be felt not only by those with
ideological and emotional investment in the pro-choice position, but also by
those women, regardless of their ideological positions, who are getting an
abortion. No matter how easy it will be to procure an illegal abortion, there is
an inevitable loss of dignity in having to act surreptitiously and participate in a
violation of the law.
For those committed to the pro-choice ideology, moreover, two other
effects of the overruling of Roe v. Wade will also be of great concern.
Whatever lowering there will be in the number of abortions obtained by
women desiring them, it will come at the expense of the poor and the
ignorant. This is an affront to their ideas of equality, over and above their
views of women's rights.
Moreover, abortion, when illegal, will also be more dangerous than when
legal. Nonetheless, the increased percentage of abortions performed by
physicians pre-Roe v. Wade was important in decreasing the death rate, and
this trend is likely to be accentuated as to any future illegal abortions. And, of
course, to a considerable extent the changes in technology since Roe v. Wade
will make this problem less serious. In fact, if Roe v. Wade is overruled, illegal
abortions (aside from those which are self-induced with improvised
instruments), will probably have a lower fatality rate than legal abortions did
at the time of Roe v. Wade.
How the pro-choice faction will weigh their losses against what they have
retained is not easy to predict. Again, views will differ, and determining in
advance their center of gravity is extremely difficult. In one respect, however,
the pro-choice faction will be clear losers if Roe v. Wade is overruled. They will
be forced back into the political arena to defend what they believe is their
inalienable right. Seeming far more involved in careers and other activities
outside the home than are the anti-abortion activists, they may feel much
more keenly the additional demands upon their time and energies, regardless
of the ultimate results.
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X
CONCLUSION: THE AMERICAN COMPROMISE
In a way, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, if it occurs, would produce a kind
of pragmatic American compromise, intended and desired by no one, but not
completely without precedent. Although society is adamantly opposed on
moral grounds to addiction to opiates, methadone is given to large numbers
of heroin addicts. While society is opposed on moral grounds to gambling,
many states have lotteries, and indeed, gambling laws are not enforced in
most of the others. Though hundreds of millions of dollars are spent
attempting to suppress marijuana growth and importation, and each year
some 500,000 people are arrested on marijuana charges, the drug is widely
available in virtually every American high school and college. In one-third of
the states, the use of the drug is not even a criminal offense; and in most of
the rest of the nation, the jailing of a marijuana user or small-scale possessor
is a rarity.
In short, if Roe v. Wade were overruled, political battles over abortion
might arise on a scale not yet seen. Eventually, somewhat fewer abortions
would probably take place than under conditions of complete legality. In
addition, the change would be felt mostly by the poor and the ignorant.
Nonetheless, most illegal abortions would take place at a cost and a danger
substantially more similar to that of a legal abortion today than to that before
Roe v. Wade.
It is true that the situation might reinforce the anti-abortion activist's view
as to the role of women in society by withdrawing the Supreme Court's
opposition and by having the state (or at least more states than the none of
which do so today) explicitly take this position. On the other hand, if indeed
the pro-lifers are correct in their view that members of the pro-choice faction
are utilitarians, many of those in favor of legal abortions will feel that as a
practical matter, despite their defeat on the symbolic level, they will be able to
get much of what they want. Certainly, if the nation's experiences with
enforcing laws against vice crimes is any indication, this will be the case.
Moreover, pro-choice activists may well take some comfort in the long-
range effect of a symbolic but temporary victory over another vice.
Prohibition, a law adopted in great part for symbolic effect, was later found to
be, in its practical consequences, too much for society to bear. Whether the
same will be true in the abortion area is, however, by no means clear. It can
just as easily be argued that, if Roe v. Wade is overruled, abortion will be more
like consensual homosexuality today. In som states it is legal. In others, due
to the failure of the Supreme Court to intervene,124 it is still illegal but the
laws against it are generally unenforced. An observer looking at the amount
of homosexuality in the two categories of states would most likely be able to
discern no difference, over and above the difference in moral climate between
the two groups of states that had initially produced the differences in law.
124. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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So long as those seeking abortions can still find them, pro-choice activists
can devote their energies to attempting to convince the political bodies to act
in accordance with their ideology. If accomplished, this political victory might
be even sweeter than the one provided, as it were, free of charge by the
Supreme Court.

